Bahrain does not have a compensation policy. The kingdom imports about 80% of its weapons from the United States via FMS, and the rest of the arms acquisition comes from the United Kingdom. However, a specific offset policy is expected shortly.  Nation P also assigns a credit value for each type of offset offered by Company S. The value of the credit for clearing bonds is not “real value” but “real value” by a multiplier expressing the degree of interest of Nation P (buyer) for the proposed offsets. In other words, something that is considered very valuable by Nation P will have a great multiplier that expresses the significance and value of this kind of shift to Nation P. The multiplier (z.B 2, 5 or 7) reflects the attached value of Nation P as a credit value, which is ultimately declared to meet the agreed amount of $480 million (120% of the offset); It is obvious that without multipliers, 120% offset would be absurd. Most offset packages are divided into direct and indirect offsets. Here is a hypothetical and complex offset offer, divided into direct and indirect offsets in nation P. No formal offset directive.
The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) was directly dependent on the Prime Minister and was responsible for the procurement of defence equipment, the Office of Equipment and the Office of Finance. However, since 2007, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) has been transformed into a comprehensive ministry of defence, with a minister in ministerial decisions. Most of Japan`s defence import comes from the United States and is governed by bilateral agreements. The majority of defence offers are made through the representation of Japanese commercial enterprises, although direct offers are theoretically possible. There is an unspoken policy for Japan`s largest companies, which is understood as a “Japanese” product policy. Two points: Japan, Germany and Italy, despite obvious cultural differences, have similar political attitudes with regard to the “balance” of foreign arms purchases. But Japan has limited itself to arms exports in the name of political principles, then official laws, and since the 1970s, the Japanese defence industry has been limited to the Japanese domestic market. In the case of medium and large tenders for weapons systems, the offer can be very complex, involving one or more companies as bidders. The main offer is managed by a senior contractor who may have associated companies other than partners or subcontractors with the offer.
However, with respect to the agreed compensation proposal, only the principal contractor is responsible for its performance vis-à-vis the final customer. As compensation becomes more complex, the principal contractor can hire subcontractors to meet its contractual obligations. While the responsibility for offsets remains in the hands of the main contractor, the order can be executed by a subcontractor or offset delivery payer. One of the collateral advantages of offsets in the United States (probably not offsetting the negative effects of defence offsets on the economy and employment) is the spread of legal and economic jobs in the “offset sector,” which ranges from international law firms to the full international offices of U.S. defense firms. In addition, the creation of new companies in “offset” venture capital, in “offset” marketing support: the “offsets” that provide support to the defence and aerospace industries. While many offset programs were originally developed as a result of defense and aerospace sales, many new offset/industrial partnership programs have developed today to improve their industrial base, technology level and become more autonomous in a wide range of sectors.